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788 PBIDONOFF tI. BALOKOVlCB [36 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 21512. ID Bank. Mar. 6, 1951.) 
ERIC L. PRIDONOFF, Appellant, v. ZLATKO BALO-
KOVICH et al .• Respondents. 
[1] Libel-Actionable Words-Words Tending to Injure in Occu-
pation.-An article is libelous which eharges that onf' de-
scribed therein as a member of an American Embassy enjZ'aged , 
in such flagrant espionage that the United States honored 
a l'f!quest for his recall, aince it implies that he is not fit for 
his position and tends to injure him in his occupation. 
[2a,2b] Id.-Damages.-ln an action for damages for publication 
of a libel in a newspaper, plaintiff's failure to allege a demand 
for a correction and that no correction was published precludes 
recovery of general or exemplary damages. (Civ. Code, § 48a.) 
[3] Id.-Damages.-Notwithatanding that an action for a libel 
published in a newspaper is against the &ctual author of the 
article rather than the publisher, Civ. Code, § 48a, precludes 
recovery of more than special damages unless plaintiif serves 
a notice on the publisher demanding retraction, and no re-
traction is published. 
[4] Id.-Oomplaint-Damages.-In a libel action, plaintiff's alle-
gations of special damages are sufficiently specific to sustain 
a cause of action therefor, where he alleges that as a result 
of the publication of the libel he lost employment with a named 
employer, for a specified period, and to his damage in a named 
amount. 
[5] Pleading - Manner - Information and Belief. - Plaintiff who 
seeks special damages in a libel action for loss of employment 
may allege on information and belief the amount of his finan-
cial loss, and that it was caused by the libel, since such facts 
are not necessarily within his personal knowledge and may 
be ascertainable only from declarations of others. (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 446.) 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Ccurt of Los 
Angeles County. William B. McKesson, Judge. Reversed 
with directions. 
[1) See 16 Oal.Jur. 45; sa Am.Jur. 80. Retraction as affecting 
right of action or amount of damages for libel or slander, note, 
13 A.L.R. 794. See. also, 16 Oa1.Jur. 128; 33 Am.Jur. 193. 
[5] See 21 Oal.Jur. 48; 41 Am.Jur. S16. 
McK. Dig. References: P 1 Libel, US; [2, 3] Libel, 127; [4:1 
Libel, i 61; [6] Pleading, 136. 
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Action for damages for libel. Judgment of dismissal on 
IUStaining demurrer to third amended complaint without 
leave to amend, reversed with directions. 
Paul Barksdale D 'Orr and Brodie E. Ahlport for Appel-
lant. 
Edward Mosk, Pacht, Tannenbaum & Ross, Clore Warne 
and Stuan Kadison for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of dis-
missal of his action for libel, entered pursuant to an order 
sustaining without leave to amend defendants' demurrer to 
his third amended complaint. 
Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that ,. defendants together 
composed, wrote and caused to be printed and published, of 
and concerning the plaintiff, in a daily newspaper known as 
'Narodni Glasnik,' and distributed to, and which was read by, 
large numbers of people in the County of Los Angeles, and 
in other parts of the State of California, and numerous other 
cities and counties throughout the United States, the follow-
ing matter: 
" 'Eric Pridonoff, while one of the American Embassy in 
Belgrade, was caught carrying on dagrant espionage activi-
ties. The Yugoslav government requested his recall and we 
recalled him. When Pridonoff got back to the United States; 
he wrote a series of articles for the Hearst press violently 
attacking the Yugoslav government and intimating clearly 
that if the Yugoslav people would revolt against their govern-
ment, we would help them. These articles were mimeo-
graphed both in English and Serbo-Croatian, and distributed 
through the American Reading Room in Belgrade. We read 
. them ourselves while we were there.' .. 
In the first count of his complaint plaintiif alleged that 
defendants wrote and published the allegedly libelous article, 
that all the statements therein, with the exception of the state-
ment that plaintiff .was a member of the American Embassy, 
were false, that defendants knew the statements were false 
and caused their publication out of malice and ill will toward 
plaintiff with intention to injure, disgraee; and defame him, 
and that as a result of the publication of the statements 
plaintiff suffered general damages in the amount of $100,000. 
-
~) 
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In the second count plaintiff alleged that because of certain 
circumstances the statements wcre given a particularly de-
famatory interpretation by the persons who read them. It 
was further alleged that plaintiff "is informed and believes 
and therefore alleges that asa direct and proximate result 
of said false and malicious publication, and its consequent 
injury to his reputation as a man, and as a consulting engi-
neer, he suffered special damages in this, that he lost employ-
ment, between July I, 1947, and February I, 1~48, as an 
engineer with Parsons Aerojet Company, of Los Angeles, 
California, and compensation $5,000." Plaintiff prayed for 
judgment in the amounts of $100,000 general damages, $100,-
000 exemplary damages, and $5,000 special damages. 
Libel is defined as .. a false and unprivileged publication by 
writing . . . which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, 
ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or 
avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occu-
pation." (Civ. Code, § 45.) Defendants contend that the 
article was not libelous in describing plaintiff as being engaged 
in espionage for the United States; that it is pruper and 
praiseworthy for a person to be a spy for his own country. 
Had the article said only that plaintiff was engaged in es-
pionagefor the United States, defendants' contentiun might 
have merit. [1] The article went further, however. It 
described plaintiff as one of the American Embassy, a person 
who should not engage in espionage, and charged that never-
theless he engaged in such flagrant espionage activity that 
his recall was requested and that the United States honored 
the request. The pUblication thus carried the clear impli-
cation that plaintiff was unfit for his job as a representative 
of the United States serving abroad. It had a direct tendency 
to injure him in his occupation and was accordingly libelous. 
[2&] Plaintiff cannot recover general or exemplary dam-
ages, however. Civil Code, section 48a, provides: 
•• In any action for damages for the pUblication of a libel 
in a newspaper, or of a slander by radio broadcast, plaintiff 
shall recover no more than special damages unless a correc-
tion be demanded and be not published or broadcast, as here-
inafter provided. Plaintiff shall serve upon the publisher, 
at the place of publication or broadcaster at the place of· 
broadcast, a written notice specifying the statements claimed 
to be libelous and demanding that the same be corrected. 
Said notice and demand must be served within 20 days after 
) 
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knowledge of the publication or broadcast of the statements 
claimed to be libelous." 
[3] The plain language of the statute governs •• any action 
for damages for the publication of a libel in a newspaper." 
(Italics added.) Even though plaintiff's action is for the 
publication of a libel in a newspaper, he contends that by 
virtue of the provision requiring service of the demand for 
correction on the publisher the statute applies only to the 
publisher and not to his employees, columnists, and other 
authors. (See Comer v. Louisville etc. Railroad Co., 151 
Ala. 622 (44 So. 676, 677].) Since his action is against the 
authors of the alleged libel and not against the newspaper 
publisher he concludes that section 48a has no application. 
It does not follow, however, that because the person upon 
whom the notice to retract must be served is the publisher 
of the newspaper, the statute applies to him alone. Reporters, 
columnists, authors, critics, editors, and the publisher are 
all participants in newspaper publications. When error is 
made, however, it is the publisher who has power to make 
correction. In providing for the substitution of a retraction 
for general and exemplary damages it was reasonable, there-
fore, for the Legislature to provide that the notice should be 
served upon him. The retraction provides as adequate a 
substitute for general and exemplary damages in the case of 
a suit against the author as in one against the newspaper 
publisher himself. [2b] Since plaintiff does not allege a 
demand for the publication of a correction or the refusal 
thereof, section 48a precludes recovery of general or exemplary 
damages arising from the publication of the alleged libel. 
(Werner v. Southern California Associated Newspapers, 35 
Cal.2d 121 (216 P.2d 825, 13 A.L.R.2d 252J.) 
Plaintiff does allege, however, that he has suffered special 
damages as a result of the publication of the alleged libel. 
Section 48a permits their recovery even though no correction 
has been demanded or refused. The general demurrer was 
therefore properly sustained only if the allegation of special 
damages is insufficient to sustain a cause of action therefor. 
Special damages are "all damages whicb plaintiff alleges 
and proves that be bas suffered in respect to his property, 
business, trade, profession or occupation, including such 
amounts of money as the plaintiff alleges and proves he has 
expended as a result of the allcg('d libel, lind no other." 
(Civ. Code, § 48a.) If special damages are claimed, as in the 
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present case, for mjury to the plaintiff's trade, profession, 
or occupation, the uature and extent of the loss must be 
specifically set forth. "To prevent a surprise on the defend-
ant it is the geueral rule that the plaintiff must state in his 
complaint the particular damage which he has sustained or 
be will not be permitted to give evidence of it." (Skaggs v. 
Wiley, 108 Cal.App. 429, 434 [292 P. 132) ; Peabody v. Bar-
ham. 52 Cal.App.2d 581, 585 [126 P.2d 668); Lejeune v. 
General Petroleum Corp., 128 Cal.App. 404, 418-419 [18 
P .2d 429].) A general allegation of the loss of a prospective 
employment, sale, or profit will not suffice. (Peabody v. 
Barham, supra; Wilson v. Dubois, 35 Minn. 471, 473-474 
[29 N.W. 68, 59 Am.Rep. 335]; Denney v. Northwestern 
Credit Assn;, 55 Wash. 331, 333 [104 P. 769, 25 L.R.A.N.S. 
1021]; DeWitt v. Scarlett, 113 Md. 47, 51-52 [77 A. 271); 
7'ower v. Crosby, 214 App.Div. 392 [212 N.Y.S.219, 220); 
Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225,237 [23 L.Ed. 308).) 
[4] Plaintiff's allegation of special damage is sufficiently 
specific. He alleges that as a result of the publication of the 
alleged libel he has lost employment with a specific elDployer, 
the Parsons Aerojet Company, for a specified period, to his 
damage in the amount of $5,000. Defendants are thereby 
informed of the exact nature of the claim of special damages 
and afforded an opportunity to prepare a defense against it. 
That is all that is required of the allegation. 
[6] Defendants contend, however, that the allegation is 
insufficient for the reason that the special damages are alleged 
only on information and belief. Plaintiff may allege on in-
formation and belief any matters that are not within his 
personal knowledge, if he has information leading him to 
believe that the allegations are true. (Code Civ. Proc., § 446 ; 
Campbell-Kawannanakoa v. Campbell, 152 Cal. 201, 206 [92 P. 
184]; North v. Cecil B. DeMille Productions, 2 Cal.2d 55, 
58-59 [39 P.2d 199); Swars v. Council of City of Vallejo, 
64 Cal.App.2d 858, 865 [149 P.2d 397}; Thompson v. Sutton, 
60 Cal.App.2d 272, 279 [122 P.2d 976).) Plaintiff would 
ordinarily learn that he lost employment because of the libel 
from the declarations of others. It is therefore appropriate 
for him to allege such matters on information and belief. 
(Campbell-Kawannanakoa v. Campbell, supra.) 
HaU v. James, 79 Ca1.App. 433. 435-436 [249 P. 876], does 
Dot compel a contrary result. In that case the court held 
insuffieit'nt an alleJ.!ation on Information and belief of the 
tUDount of damages sustaiueJ by plaintiff as the result of 
) 
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defendant's breach of contract. The court recognized that 
matters that are not within the personal knowledge of the 
pleader may be alleged on information and belief, but stated 
that "plaintiff is certainly in a position to know better than 
any informant the financial loss he sustained by reason of 
the breach of contract." (Hall v. James, 79 Cal.App. at 
436 [249 P. 876].) In the present case, the amount of finan-
cial loss plaintiff has sustained and the fact that the loss was 
caused by the libel are (not necessarily within his personal 
knowledge, but may be ascertainable only from the declara-
tions of others and may therefore be alleged on information 
and belief. 
The judgment. is reversed and the cause remanded with 
directions to overrule the demurrer and to allow defendants 
to answer. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the reversal of the judgment of 
dismissal, but do not agree with the law stated in the majority 
opInIon. The majority decision holds that, by implication 
at least, section 48a of the Civil Code is valid and that it 
applies to the author of a newspaper article although he has 
no connection with the newspaper or its publisher; that is, 
that unless a correction or retraction is demanded and refused, 
only special damages may be recovered against the author for 
the publication of a libelous article in a newspaper. I cannot 
agree with that proposition ferr two reasons: (1) Section 48a, 
which grants to newspapers immunity from liability for libel-
ous publications, is invalid, and its invalidity is brought into 
sharp focus when it is extended to the author of the libelous 
article. (2) Section 48a does not apply to authors. . 
The validity of section 48a has been befor,e this court here-
tofore (Werner v. 80tLthern Cal. Associated Newspapers, 35 
Ca1.2d 121 [216 P.2d 825, 13 A.L.R.2d 252]). I filed a dis-
senting opinion in that case, and the Supreme Court of the 
United States allowed an appeal, but a settlement was made 
of plaintiff's claim and the appeal has been dismissed. I 
adhere to the views expressed in my dissent in the Werner 
case, but it is apparent that the broadened scope now given 
to section 48a by the majority opinion in this case emphasizes 
its unconstitutionality and calls for further discussion. Under 
the construction now given to RE'<'tion 488, 8 correction or 
retraction would have to be Ilellulllllell of an author of an 
) 
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article if it appeared in a newspaper, but if the identical 
statements appeared in an article published in a magazine 
or in pamphlet form there would be no immunity. By what 
legerdemain is an author immunized from general and exem-
plary damages when his libelous article is published il1 a 
newspaper, but is not so immunized when sllch article is pub-
lished in a magazine, pamphlet or other form of publication' 
What possible basis could exist for so classifying authors of 
libelolls articles? These ql1estions are not answered in the 
majority opinion. 
In bolding there was no denial of equal protection, the 
maj()rit~, said in fhl' Werner case (p. 132): "The Legislature 
conld rea!':onably conclude that drfamation suits against news-
papers and radio stations constituted the most conspicuous 
example of the danger it sought to preclude. It is not pro-
hibited by the equal protection clause from striking the evil 
where it is felt most. Similarly in this case, we cannot 
say that the Legislature could not reasonably conclude that 
bpcanse of the business they are engaged in, newspapers and 
radio stations are the most frequent objects of defamation 
actions and that the danger of ex('Pssive damages in actions 
against them is greatest becausr of their reputed ability to 
pay. See, Morris. Inadvertent Newspaper Ubel and Retrac-
tion, 32 m.L.Rev. 36,43; ct., Packard v. Moore, 9 Ca1.2d 571, 
fi78-580 r 7] P .2d 9221, discussing rule of inadmissibility of 
eviilence that defendant is insured in personal injury actions. 
"Moreover, in balancin!! the danger of recoveries of exces-
Ri,'p !!,eneral damages against leaving plaintiffs with no effec-
tive remedy for injury to their repntations, the Legislature 
could properly take into consideration the fact that a retrac-
tion widely c1rculated by a newspaper or radio siaNon would 
have greater effectiveness than a retraction by an individual 
and could thus class newspapers and radio stations apart .. 
"Section 48a may also be sl1!':tained under the equal pro-
tection elause on th(' theory that its purpose is to encourage 
the dissemination of news. Although it extends its protec-
tion to those who may deliberately and maliciously dissemi-
nate libels, the Legislature could reasonably conclude that it 
was necessary to go so far effectively to protect thoRe who in 
good faith and without malice inadvertently publis71 defama-
tory IItatements." (Emphasis addpd.) Thus it is seen that 
several thingR Rre stressed 8S a basis for the classification 
approved by the majority in thE' WernPT ease-the L('gisla-
tare could decide that unfounded suits against newspapers, 
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that is, the entity or publisher thereof, are of more frequent 
occurrence with the possible evil of their being mulcted for 
excessive damages because of their reputed wealth. But, 
here we do not have a suit against a newspaper as such, or 
the publisher. It is against an individual-the author of the 
libel. Merely because of the circumstance that may have 
caused it to reach the pages of a newspaper instead of a maga-
zine or pamphlet is not justification for exonerating the 
author. Authors do not fall in the class of newspapers-
publishers who are said to be conspicuously subject to un-
founded suits. Hence the classification cannot be justified 
as to authors on that ground. Furthermore, as seen from the 
foregoing quotation from the majority opinion in the Werner 
case, it is also said that the Legislature could find that those 
engaged in the "business" of operating newspapers are the 
most common objects of defamation actions because of their 
reputed ability to pay. Manifestly that reasoning cannot ap-
ply to authors, and it also indicates (later discussed) the in-
applicability of section 48a to authors. They are not in the 
newspaper business and their work might appear in a news-
paper even without their knowledge. It is also said in the 
quotation from the Werner case, supra, that newspapers are 
more widely circulated and thus a retraction would be more 
effective. An author as such has DO circulating medium, 
for be publishes nothing, and a demand upon him to make a 
retraction would be idle, for he could not compel the news-
paper to publish it and he has no medium in which to publish 
it himself. Finally, it is said that the classification should 
extend to those who inadvertently publish defamatory state-
ments to accomplish their objective in the dissemination of 
news. An author is not disseminating news. He is not operat-
ing a newspaper with the accompanying necessity of speed iri 
bringing news to the attention of the public. 
It should be clear, therefore, that none of the reasons for 
the approval of the classification sanctioned in the Werner 
case fit the author of the defamatory statements here involved. 
All of those reasons are pertinent only to the newspaper 
business-a publisher. They do not justify a different lia-
bility merely because the defamation appears in a newspaper 
regardless of who prepared it. The ramifications arising from 
a contrary view are disturbingly many. An advertiser, a 
writer of a letter, a columnist and similar contributors to 
newspapers would thus have their liability restricted to spe-
cial damages. 
) 
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The Legislature did not intend by section 48a to exten 
protection against actions for libel beyond the publisher 0 
a newspaper. It will be remembered from the wording 0 
the section that a pUblication of a libel "in" a newspaper i 
covered. That might indicate that the only requirement wa 
that it appear in a newspaper, but "in" may be used in the 
sense of "by." (Beatty v. Hughes, 61 Cal.App.2d 489 [143 
P.2d 110).) Thus the publication must be by a newspaper 
to come within the section and the other provisions of the l 
section make that conclusion inescapable. A correction or 
retraction must be demanded of the· publisher and refused to \ 
authorize the recovery of general damages. Upon whom is the \ 
demand made! The publisher. Where' At the place of 
publication. Plainly, the publisher is the operator of the \ 
newspaper. He is not necessarily the author. The author', 
may not be in the publishing business. He does not neces-: 
sarily have a place of publication. If "publish" is given a' 
broad connotation to mean any place the libel is circulated, 
it would be impossible for the defamed person to know where . 
or upon whom he had to serve his demand. Neither the news-
paper operator nor the author would be in all places the 
paper was circulated. It can only mean, therefore, that the 
publisher is the operator of the newspaper and the place 
of publication is the site where it is produced. Moreover, 
the retraction must be published in a regular issue of the 
paper. Only the publisher issues regular editions. It would 
avail him nothing to make a demand on the author. as he could 
, not compel a retraction by the paper. Suppose the newspaper 
is published out of this state and where no correction or re-
traction is required, but the author resides in this state. Must 
a retraction be demanded before suit against the author' 
Comer v. Louisville ~ N. R. Co., 151 Ala. 622 [44 So. 676). 
is precisely in point. There the statute was similar to our 
section 48a, and the defendant had prepared an article which 
he paid the newspaper to publish. It was held that the statute 
did not apply to such person, the court saying: ". . . we are 
left to the wording of the statute and its apparent object for 
our guide in its interpretation. The statute provides that the 
notice shall be served in writing 'on the publisher or pub-
lishers of said newspaper,' and no provision is made for serv-
ing notice on any other pefson. The act seems to be for. 
the purpose of preventing litigation in regard to those arti-
cles which may have found their way into the columns of 
the newspapers by inadvertence or without knowledge or care-
) 
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ful scrutiny on the part of the publishers. We know tlJa t 1 he 
modern daily paper, with its numerous reporters, gat hl'l"Ill/-! 
news from every quarter, and its busy elllployees, wurkillg' 
until late into the night to place the latest uews before the 
readers early in the morning is peculiarly liable to beillg 
inadvertently led into trouble in these matters, and it !;(>l'IlIS 
a proper classification to regulate this class ()f libel suits as 
applied to the publishers of newspapers. But with the indio 
vidual, who prepares his article and pays for its publication, 
no such reason exists. For these reasons we hold that this 
provision of the statute does not apply to the defendants in 
this suit. It is true that the Supreme Court of ~orth Caro· 
lina applied a libel law somewhat similar to our statnte to an 
individual who was sued for a libel published in a newspaper; 
but it is to be noted that the partiCUlar point was not raisC'll 
in that case, and, besides, the wording of the statute was diff·cr· 
ent, in that the North Carolina statute required that the 
notice should be served 'on the defendant or defendants,' auLi 
not on the publisher of the newspaper, as in our statute. 
Williams v. Smith, 134 N.C. 249, 46 S.B. 502." The same 
trend has been evidenced in other cases. (Clementson v. 
Minnesota Tribune Co., 45 Minn. 303 [47 N.W. 781], stating 
that the purpose of the statute was to reqnire !,;pryiee 011 the 
publisher of the newspaper; Thorso'Tt v. Albert Lea Publish. 
Co., 190 Minn. 200 [251 N.W. 177, 90 A.L.R. 116!)j, proteetioH 
is for newspapers because of the difficulties of preveJltillg' 
mistakes j Lydiard v. Wingaie, 131 Minn. 355 [1!'i5 N.W. 212).) 
That the intention of the Legislature must be ascertained 
from the words it uses is clearly stated by tIll' author of the 
majority opinion in this case as author of the llwjority llpill' 
ion in People v. Knowles, 35 Cal.2d 175, 182 [217 P.2<l 11. 
Re there said: "The will of the Legislature mllst be deter· 
mined from the statutes; intentions callHot be ascribed to it 
at odds with the intentions articulated in the statutes. 
The court turns first to the words themselves for the nnswer . 
. . . Primarily, however, the words, in arrangement that SIl· 
perimposes the purpose of the Legislature upon their dic-
tionary meaning, stand in immobilized sentry, remin<il'J"s that 
whether their arrangement was wisdom or folly, it \Va!'; wit· 
tingly undertaken and not to be disregarde(l." EWll if the 
statute is snsceptible of either constrnctioll. that )!i\"l'1l it by 
the majority decision raises seriolls eOllstitlltiollnl questions 
not considered in the 'Werner rusp and hellt·(, th(' I'slablisheo 
rule applies that: "It is a well·rl'coguizeu canon of interpre· 
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tation that, where a legislative enactment is susceptib1r of 
two constructions, one consistent and the other inconsistent 
with the provisions of the constitution, such enactment should 
be so constrned as to make it harmonious with the constitution 
and comport with the legitimate powers of the legislature." 
(5 Cal.Jur. 615.) 
Being of the opinion that the complaint states a cause of 
action for special. general and exemplary damages. the judg-
ment should be reversed with directions to the trial court to 
overrule the demurrer and allow the defendants to answer 
as to all the issues presented by the complaint. 
SCBA UER, J .-1 concur generally in the views and eon-
elusion reached by Mr. Justice Carter. The vice in section 
48a which seems to me most lethal, as I endeavored to point 
out in my dissent in Werner v. Southern Col. etc. Newspapers 
(1950),35 Cal.2d 12], 150 et seq. [216 P.2d 825, 13 A.L.R.2d 
252J,J is its licensing of two arbitrarily selected groups to 
ma]jcious'~' engage in deliberately false libels. 
The courts of last resort, both state and national, bave un-
remittingly given staunch support to the constitutional free-
doms of speech and press as against prior restraints. I am 
one who has been zealous to that end; but I had thought that 
the injustices which sometimes must flow from lack of prior re-
straints would be deterred. mitigated or compensated by sub-
sequent responsibility. general and punitive. for abuses of 
the right.2 Then in the Werner case, I found the state Legis-
lature giving. and a majority of this court npholding, prior 
absolution to thE' selerted groups of newspapers and radio 
broadcasters as against subsequent rE'sponsibility for either 
general or punitive damages and regardless of whether the 
librl or slander werE' inadvertent or knowingly and mali-
ciol1sl~' false. 
'Whetht'1" tht' majority holrling in Wnner will stand on review by 
thf' Unitt'rl !';tnt.es ~upri'mt' Court has not as yet been determined. 
(Appt'ol to {lnit.t'd ~tntes Supremt' Court filed Aug. 25, 1950 f19 U.S. 
Law Wt'ek 30741; prohnhlp. jurillitit'tion noted Oct. 16, 1950 19 U.s. 
Law Wrek. !\10". 14. 19fiO. (ndu, p. 20); appeal dismissed on motion 
of l'ou.nsel for appellant .Jan. 2, 1951 fIP U.S. Law Week. Feb. 6, 
1951. ~upplE'nll'nt to Index. p. 111.) 
·Californh. Constitution, article I. st'ction 9: "ETery citizeD may 
freely IIpenll, write. and puhlish bi~ aentiments on al1 subjeets, being 
responsihle for the abusE' of that right ...• " 
Ch·n Code, 1IP'(·tioTl 3294: "(Wjhere the defendant haa beeD guilty 
of mlllict' the plaintiff, in additioTl to the actual clamagee, 
may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of p11lliall. 
ini the dcft'Ddant." 
Mar. 1951] YOUNG V. HAMPTON 
136 C.2d 799; 228 P.2d 1) 
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Now I find the majority of the court extending their eon· 
struction and effective application of the legislative act (Civ 
Code, § 48a) to immunize the author of a slander or libel, 
whether inadvertent or deliberate. as well as the newspaper 
or broadcasting agency which gives circulation to the calumny. 
An author, my prevailing associates hold, may deliberately 
and maliciously compose the vil('Rt calumny. and if he can 
procnre its publication in 8 newspaper or by a broadcasting 
company,by paid advertisement or otherwise, he can come 
within the encouraging arms of section 48a and repose securely 
immune from either general or punitive damages. 
Does the spawning of such a doctrine bring pride to the 
free press of America' Or, perhaps, does the insistence of 
the newspapers and broadcasters on having something very 
akin to foolproof statutory immunity from liability in all 
libcl-slander cases, just and unjust, rather than leaving to 
the cOllrts their protection as against nnfonnded claims, stem 
in some measure from the very fact that a conrt of last resort 
which will sustain such a doctrine may be found' 
